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This paper studies how changes in the two key parameters of unemployment insurance – the 
benefit replacement rate (RR) and the potential duration of benefits (PBD) – affect the 
duration of unemployment. In 1989, the Austrian government made unemployment insurance 
more generous by changing, simultaneously, the maximum duration of regular unemployment 
benefits and the earnings replacement ratio. We find that increasing the replacement ratio has 
much weaker disincentive effects than increasing the maximum duration of benefits. We use 
these results to split up the total costs to unemployment insurance funds into costs due to 
changes in the unemployment insurance system and costs due to behavioral responses of 
unemployed workers. Results indicate that costs due to behavioural responses are substantial. 
JEL Code: C41, J64, J65. 
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This paper studies how changes that make unemployment systems more generous aﬀect the duration
of unemployment. Most unemployment insurance systems are characterized by two major parameters:
the level of unemployment beneﬁts (in relation to previous earnings); and the maximum duration that
an unemployed worker can draw such beneﬁts. Reliable empirical evidence on how these parameters
aﬀect the search behavior of unemployed workers is crucial for designing appropriate policies. Most
previous empirical studies identify such incentive eﬀects from ’exogenous’ variation, separately, either
in a change in beneﬁt levels or a change in the potential duration of beneﬁts. While the ceteris paribus
eﬀects of changes in such parameters are clearly interesting per se, it does not allow to address potentially
important questions of the appropriate design of unemployment insurance.
There are mainly three issues that will be addressed in this paper and that have not been stud-
ies in previous papers. First, our study allows us to compare the magnitude by which either of these
two parameters aﬀects the transition rates of workers from unemployment to a new job. This is very
important, as it gives immediate evidence of the relative eﬀectiveness of the two policy parameters.
Second, by focusing on a major policy change that, simultaneously, increased the generosity of unem-
ployment beneﬁts along the level- and the duration-dimension of unemployment beneﬁts, we are able to
study whether there are possible interaction eﬀects between these two key-parameters. In other words,
we study whether the combined eﬀect of a simultaneous increase beneﬁt-levels and beneﬁt-duration is
larger, smaller, or equal in size, than the sum of eﬀects resulting from separate changes in these two
parameters. Third, our paper proposes a new and insightful simulation method that calculates the
ﬁnancial costs for the unemployment insurance funds of changes in these two key parameters. And
it splits these costs into direct costs - given the same distribution of unemployment durations an in-
crease in beneﬁt levels - and into indirect costs - resulting from behavioral responses of unemployment
individuals. This sheds new light on the role of two key policy parameters in aﬀecting the costs to
unemployment insurance funds.
At a more general level, there is considerable interest on the issue of disincentives eﬀects of unem-
ployment insurance systems, both from the point of view of economic policy, and from a more theoretical
perspective. The role of unemployment insurance parameters is of considerable interest in the current
economic policy debate. Facing persistently high unemployment rates, a number of (European) coun-
tries are discussing and/or implementing new unemployment insurance rules. An important part of
those new rules concern changes both in the beneﬁt-levels and beneﬁt-durations. Hence it is interesting
to know what eﬀects one can expect from such changes. There is a considerable theoretical literature
regarding the extent to which such changes aﬀect the optimal job search strategy of workers. Job search
theory oﬀers sharp predictions on how changes in the key parameters in unemployment insurance will
aﬀect the exit rate. However, whereas there is considerable evidence regarding the impact of potential
beneﬁt duration on the one hand and on the impact of replacement ratio on the other hand, we are not
aware of studies that contrasts the eﬀects of changes to both unemployment insurance parameters.
The present paper identiﬁes the causal eﬀect of beneﬁt duration on the willingness of individuals
to accept jobs using a policy change that took place in Austria in 1989. This policy change provides a
nice empirical design. Access to extended beneﬁt duration was contingent upon age and previous work
2experience whereas access to higher beneﬁt levels was contingent upon previous earnings. The increase
in potential beneﬁt duration was considerable and was itself contingent on age. It extended beneﬁts for
workers of ages 40-49 from 30 weeks before the policy change to 39 weeks after the change - a 33 %
increase in potential beneﬁt duration; and for workers above age 50 from 30 weeks before to 52 weeks
after the policy change - a 73 % increase in beneﬁt duration. Furthermore, the policy change took
place in 1989 which, in Austria, was quite a stable macroeconomic environment. This implies that our
study is less subject to endogenous policy bias than other studies. Endogenous policy bias arises when
more generous unemployment insurance rules are implemented in anticipation of a deteriorating labor
market. Such a policy bias has been found important in several recent studies (Card and Levine, 2000,
Lalive and Zweim¨ uller, 2004a). To assess the eﬀect of these changes in unemployment insurance rules,
we use a large and informative data set that allows us to trace workers’ unemployment histories over
an extended period of time. We compare the entire unemployment inﬂow that took place two years
before the policy change to the entire inﬂow two years after the change. This leaves us with a rather
large data-set and allows us to estimate the interesting policy parameters quite precisely.
The paper is organized as follows. The following section discusses the relevant theoretical arguments
and also provides a discussion of previous empirical evidence regarding the eﬀects of the two key
parameters of unemployment insurance. Section 3 gives the relevant institutional background on the
changes to UI in Austria that are used to identify the eﬀects of beneﬁt parameters on unemployment
duration. Section 4 provides a ﬁrst descriptive analysis of the eﬀects of UI on unemployment duration.
Section 5 presents the econometric analysis regarding the eﬀects on the unemployment exit rate, and
section 6 concludes with a summary of the results.
2 Theory and previous studies
2.1 Theory
Job search theory generates sharp predictions regarding the eﬀects of PBD and RR on the unemployment
exit rate (Burdett 1979, Mortensen 1977, Mortensen 1990, Van den Berg 1990). These predictions are
summarized in Figure 1.
The upper panel in Figure 1 shows how an increase in the RR may aﬀect the unemployment exit rate
(θ). Two eﬀects are stressed in the literature. On one hand, increasing RR leads to a strong disincentive
eﬀect at the beginning of the unemployment spell because beneﬁt payments increase immediately (period
0 to beneﬁt exhaustion E). On the other hand, because renewal of beneﬁts depends on working, after
beneﬁts have been exhausted, the unemployment exit rate may be higher than in the system with a
low RR. Thus, the unemployment exit hazard will be lower in the beginning and possibly higher after
beneﬁts have been exhausted.
In contrast, an extension of PBD does entail only small immediate disincentive eﬀects for workers
at the beginning of the unemployment spell. Most of the action will be just before beneﬁt exhaustion
in the old system until just after beneﬁt exhaustion in the new system. This is because prolonged PBD
delays the period of rapid increase in the unemployment exit rate that is characteristic of a system
with limited unemployment beneﬁt receipt. Thus, the ratio between the exit rate in the new system
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4(θ1) and the exit rate in the old system (θ0) will be less than 1 in the time period covered by regular
unemployment beneﬁts in the old system (0 to E0). Second, this ratio is expected to increase strongly
and eventually exceed 1 in the period between old beneﬁt exhaustion and new beneﬁt exhaustion (from
E0 to E1).
2.2 Previous empirical studies
There are several US studies concerning potential beneﬁt duration and its eﬀect on the exit rate from
unemployment.1 Grossman (1989), Moﬃtt and Nicholson (1982), and Moﬃtt (1985) for example study
the eﬀects of extended PBD that take place in the US during recessionary periods. Meyer (1990) and
Katz and Meyer (1990) ﬁnd for US data that the exit rate from unemployment rises sharply just before
beneﬁts are exhausted. Such sharp increases are absent for nonrecipients. For beneﬁt recipients they ﬁnd
spikes around exhaustion points in both the new job ﬁnding rates and the recall rates. This suggest that
unemployed search harder just before the expiration of beneﬁts or they return to pre-arranged jobs just
before they loose their beneﬁts. However, Meyer (1990) shows that even if workers are entitled to longer
beneﬁts the ’spike’ still occurs at the same place as before the beneﬁt extension. Katz and Meyer (1990)
also conclude that the adverse incentive eﬀect of extended beneﬁt periods is larger than the negative
incentive eﬀect of reduced beneﬁt levels. Card and Levine (2000) argue that US research on the eﬀect of
longer UI beneﬁts on the duration of UI spells is based on diﬀerences across states. The diﬀerences are
partly related to recessions and related endogenous policy responses. Therefore, research may lead to an
overstatement of the eﬀect of longer UI-beneﬁts on the duration of UI-spells. Furthermore, US studies,
often focus on a public ﬁnance question since they study the impact of maximum beneﬁt duration on
compensated unemployment spell lengths and not on total unemployment. Nevertheless, Card and
Levine (2000) themselves ﬁnd similar results as before in their analysis of the New Jersey extended
beneﬁt program. Card and Levine (2000) report a disincentive eﬀect of .07 weeks per additional week
of PBD. Furthermore, they suggest that the ’traditional spike’ may have to do with factors other than
the strategic timing of job starting dates. They suggest that workers are conditioned to become less
selective around the time UI typically expires. An alternative explanation is that there is an implicit
contract between unemployed workers and their previous employers to be hired around the traditional
time of beneﬁt expiration. They attribute the fact that the implicit contract does not adjust to the
new expiration date to the fact that the extended beneﬁt program was a short-term policy. In both
cases a longer-term policy may have a bigger eﬀect. A recent US study by Addison and Portugal (2004)
conﬁrms the earlier results. Prior to the beneﬁt exhaustion the exit rate out of unemployment declines
but at and around beneﬁt exhaustion there is a sharp increase in the exit rate.
Evidence on the eﬀect of PBD in European studies is mixed. Hunt (1995) ﬁnds substantial dis-
incentive eﬀects of extended beneﬁt entitlement periods for Germany. Carling, Edin, Harkman and
Holmlund (1996) investigated whether there is an end-of-beneﬁt-period eﬀect in Sweden where there is
a job guarantee for workers that run out of beneﬁts. Here too an increase in the exit rate to employment
is found around the time when beneﬁts run out although the increase is substantially smaller than in
1Fredriksson and Holmlund (2003) give a recent overview of empirical research related to incentives in unemployment
insurance. See Green and Riddell (1993, 1997), and Ham and Rea (1987) for studies that focus on Canada.
5the US. Furthermore, at beneﬁt exhaustion there is a big increase in the outﬂow from unemployment
to labor market programs. Lubyova and Van Ours (1997) investigate the eﬀects of changes in PBD in
Slovakia. They ﬁnd that exits out of unemployment increased when the beneﬁt period was reduced and
decreased when the beneﬁt period were lengthened. However, the changes in the exit rates concern exit
to destination other than regular jobs. The job ﬁnding rate was not aﬀected by changes in the beneﬁt
period. Winter-Ebmer (1998) analyzing Austrian data ﬁnds that males react to an extended beneﬁt
period but females do not. Furthermore, he ﬁnds that the impact of beneﬁt extension is larger for long
unemployment spells than it is for short spells. Stancanelli (1999) does not ﬁnd evidence of a signiﬁcant
beneﬁt exhaustion eﬀect for Britain. Adamchik (1999) ﬁnds for Polish unemployed a large increase in
the employment hazard as the beneﬁt expiration moment approaches. Puhani (2000) on the contrary
does not ﬁnd such an eﬀect for Poland. He concludes that the change from unlimited unemployment
beneﬁts to a one year beneﬁt period that was introduced in 1991 did not aﬀect the exit rates out of
unemployment. Bratberg and Vaage (2000) investigate the eﬀects of a ﬁxed unemployment beneﬁt pe-
riod for Norway. They do not ﬁnd a signiﬁcant rise in the employment hazard before beneﬁt expiration.
They explain this from the attractiveness of labor market programs. They do ﬁnd a spike in the exit
out of unemployment suggesting that some workers stay unemployed only until their beneﬁts expire.
After that they withdraw from the labor force. When the unemployment beneﬁt period was extended to
more than 3 years the employment hazard was signiﬁcantly reduced in the ﬁrst year of unemployment.
This suggest that disincentive eﬀects materialize mostly among short-term unemployed workers. Roed
and Zhang (2003) ﬁnd for Norwegian unemployed that the exit rate out of unemployment increases
sharply in the months just prior to beneﬁt exhaustion where the eﬀect is larger for females than for
males. Cockx and Ries (2004) study Belgian unemployment insurance where beneﬁts are not limited in
time except for partners with income (usually women). Also in this study exhaustion of unemployment
beneﬁts has an important signiﬁcant positive impact on the job ﬁnding rate. Finally, Fitzenberger and
Wilke (2004) investigate the eﬀects of extended PBD for elderly workers in West-Germany during the
mid 1980s. They ﬁnd an increase in the duration of unemployment which they attribute to the behavior
of many ﬁrms and workers which used the extended PBD a part of early retirement packages.2
The eﬀects of RR on unemployment durations has been studied frequently. The bulk of the early
literature focuses on diﬀerences in the beneﬁt replacement rate between individuals. This literature
is problematic due to the possibility of unobserved heterogeneity distorting identiﬁcation in the cross-
section. There are several estimates on the elasticity of unemployment duration with respect to beneﬁts
in the early literature ranging from 0.1 to 1.0 (Atkinson and Micklewright, 1991). In some recent
European studies even bigger elasticities are found. Carling et al. (2001), studying the eﬀects of a
reduction in the RR from 80% to 75% in Sweden in 1995, ﬁnd that this policy change increased the job
ﬁnding rate by roughly 10%, implying an elasticity of around 1.7. Bennmarker et al. (2004) that deals
with changes in the Swedish UB system in the early 1990s ﬁnd a smaller elasticity of around 0.6. Roed
and Zhang (2003), in a study for Norway, estimate elasticities of around 0.95 for males and around 0.35
for females. All in all, in many European labor markets the eﬀect of changes in the RR on the job
ﬁnding rate are substantial.
2Steiner (1997) studying extensions of PBD in West-Germany in the 1980s ﬁnds that these increased unemployment
durations of males but not of females.
63 Unemployment insurance and the Austrian labor market
3.1 The System Before The Policy Change
Like in a number of other countries the Austrian unemployment insurance system is characterized by
a limited period over which unemployed individuals can draw ’regular’ unemployment beneﬁts (UB).
Unemployment beneﬁts depend on previous earnings and, compared to other European countries, the
replacement ratio (UB relative to gross monthly earnings) is rather low. Figure 2 shows that, before
August 1989, the replacement ratio declined strongly from a maximum of about 63 % (monthly income is
below 2,210 AS) to 41 % in the income range of between 3,000 to 5,000 AS previous monthly earnings.3
The beneﬁt replacement ratio then stays just below 41 % for incomes up to the cap of 27,430 AS
previous monthly earnings. Individuals earning more than 27,430 AS get UB of 11,233 AS per month
irrespective of their income. Thus, the beneﬁt replacement rate decreases monotonically in previous
monthly income for the high-income group.
Figure 2 about here
On top of UB, family allowances are paid. UB payments are not taxed and not means-tested.
Voluntary quitters and workers discharged for misconduct cannot claim beneﬁts until a waiting period
of 4 weeks has passed. UB recipients are expected to search actively for a new job that should be within
the scope of the claimant’s qualiﬁcations, at least during the ﬁrst months of the unemployment spell.
Non-compliance with the eligibility rules is subject to beneﬁt sanctions that can lead to the withdrawal
of beneﬁts for up to 4 weeks.
Before August 1989, an unemployed person could draw regular unemployment beneﬁts (UB) for a
maximum period of 20 weeks provided that he or she had paid unemployment insurance contributions
for at least 52 weeks within the last 2 years. Individuals who had contributed to UI for at least 156
weeks in the last 5 years were eligible for 30 weeks of regular unemployment beneﬁts.4
Once the period of regular unemployment beneﬁts has expired, individuals can apply for ’transfer
payments for those in need’ (”Notstandshilfe”).5 As the name indicates, these transfers are means-
tested and the job seeker is considered eligible only if she or he is in trouble. These payments depend
on the income and wealth situation of other family members and close relatives and may, in principle,
last for an indeﬁnite time period. These transfers are granted for successive periods of 39 weeks after
which eligibility requirements are recurrently checked. These post-UB transfers are lower than UB and
can at most be 92 % of UB. In 1990, the median post-UB transfer payment was about 70 % of the
median UB. Note however, that individuals who are eligible for such transfers may not be comparable
to individuals who collect UB because not all individuals who exhaust UB pass the means test.
This system applies to all of Austria except for regions with a dominant steel industry. In these steel
regions, a regional extended beneﬁt program was introduced in June 1988, that entails a dramatically
3The median monthly income was about 16,400 AS in the unemployment inﬂow from regular jobs in 1988.
4UB duration was 12 weeks for job-seekers who did not meet either previous contribution requirement. In order to
guarantee a minimum degree of homogeneity, this paper focuses on workers that have contributed for at least 52 weeks
to UI in the 2 years prior to unemployment. Thus, all workers are eligible for at least 20 weeks of UB before the policy
change.
5This implies that job seekers who do not meet UB eligibility criteria can apply at the beginning of their spell.
7Source: Austrian federal laws (Bundesgesetzblätter) no. 594/1983, 364/1989.
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after August 1989diﬀerent UI system for workers aged 50 or older. In order to focus attention on the policy change in
August 1989, we focus on the non-steel regions that were never entitled to the regional extended beneﬁt
program. See Lalive and Zweim¨ uller (2004a) and Lalive and Zweim¨ uller (2004b) for analyses of this
program.
3.2 The 1989-Changes in Policy Parameters
As of August 1, 1989 the Austrian government enacted a series of important changes to so-called
’unemployment insurance law’ (Arbeitslosenversicherungsgesetz, AlVG). The ﬁrst important change
was that the potential duration of UB payments became dependent not only on previous contributions
but also on age at the beginning of the unemployment spell. Beneﬁt duration for the age group 40-49
was increased to 39 weeks if the unemployed has been employed 312 weeks of employment within the
last 10 years prior to the current spell. For the age group 50 and older, UB-duration was increased to
52 weeks if the unemployed has been employed for at least 468 weeks within the last 15 years.
The second important change was that the beneﬁt replacement rate was increased from about 41
% to roughly 47 % in the previous income bracket between 5,000 AS and 10,000 AS (Figure 2). After
the income threshold of 10,000 AS has been crossed, the beneﬁt replacement rate is faded out quickly
to reach the former level of 41 % at 12,610 AS previous monthly income. These changes aﬀect all job
seekers as of August 1, 1989.
In the period that we study, there was a further slight increase to the beneﬁt replacement rate. As
of June 1, 1990, the Austrian government enacted an increase to the beneﬁt replacement rate for those
with previous income exceeding 12,610 but below 27,000 AS. This change essentially ensures that the
gross replacement rate is faded out from a level of 47 % to a level of 41 % over the income range 10,000
AS to 27,000 AS instead of the range from 10,000 AS to 12,610 AS.
In this paper, we focus on the eﬀect of the increase in PBD and the increase in RR in August 1989.
We do not estimate also the eﬀect of the increase in RR in July 1990, for two reasons. First, this policy
change entails a much weaker change to the beneﬁt replacement rate than the policy change in August
1989.6 Second, the July 1990 change to the RR occurs rather shortly after the August 1989 change.
This implies that the unemployment exit rate in the period before the July 1990 change but after the
August 1989 change is not identiﬁed in the period 48 weeks after entry and beyond. This time period
is, however, of substantial interest in the present analysis.
The fact that we do not account for the July 1990 change implies that the estimated treatment
eﬀects refer to treatments relative to a control treatment that does not leave unaﬀected all parameters
of the unemployment insurance system. Thus, not accounting for the July 1990 policy changes the
interpretation of the eﬀects we report but it does not aﬀect the internal validity of these eﬀects. More-
over, since we evaluate the eﬀects of these policy changes relative to a slight increase in beneﬁts, our
results give a lower bound on the eﬀects relative to no change.
6The average increase in the beneﬁt replacement rate is almost 6 percentage points for the August 1989 change. In
contrast, the replacement rate increases by a mere 1.3 percentage points due to the second policy change (Table 3).
83.3 The situation on the Austrian labor market 1987-1991
Before we go into the details of data and statistical analysis, it is instructive to look at the situation on
the Austrian labor market during the period 1987 to 1991. This is the period on which the empirical
analysis below will be concentrated.
Table 1 about here
Table 1 shows that in 1987 the economy was at the end of a recession and started to improve.
Real GDP growth was 1.7 % in 1987 and then started to grow to as much as 4.7 % in 1990. The
favorable situation of the business cycle lead to strong employment growth throughout the period
under consideration. However, it did not show up in decreasing unemployment rates. The reason was
primarily a strong increase in labor supply (a strong increase in immigration and rising female labor
force participation). That is why unemployment rose slightly despite a strong employment growth.
It is worth noting that this situation is favorable for our empirical strategy. Employment growth
during the treatment period was stronger than before. Hence it is unlikely that our results from a
comparison of the labor market experiences of older workers between the period prior to the policy
change to the post-policy period is strongly driven by a deteriorating labor market.
4 Descriptive Analysis
4.1 Data
To assess the impact of changes to ﬁnancial incentives on transition rates out of unemployment, we use
longitudinal individual data from two diﬀerent sources: (i) the Austrian social security database which
contains detailed information on the individuals’ employment, unemployment and earnings history
since the year 1972, and some information on the employer like region and industry aﬃliation; and
(ii) the Austrian unemployment register from which we get information on the relevant socio-economic
characteristics. From these data we extract a sample that contains all unemployment entrants in the
period between August 1, 1987 (2 years before the policy change) and July 31, 1991 (2 years after the
policy change). We concentrate on job seekers in the age bracket 35-54, who have at least 52 weeks within
the last 2 years, and with residence in regions that were never eligible for a special regional extended
beneﬁt program. Furthermore, in order to isolate the eﬀects of changes in PBD, we concentrate on
workers who either fulﬁll both previous contribution requirements7 or neither. We end up with 225,821
unemployment spells. The median duration of unemployment is 12 weeks. More than 85 % of spells
end in a job, 14 % of spells in a non-job exit destination (long-term sickness, pension, unknown). Since
spells are observed until May 1999, only 1 % of spells are right censored.
4.2 Construction of Groups
Table 2 summarizes the changes to unemployment insurance that were enacted in August 1989. Eli-
gibility depends on three criteria: previous gross monthly income, age, and previous work experience.
7That is, at least 312 weeks contributions in the previous 10 years and at least 512 weeks contributions in the previous
15 years.
9Real GDP Growth Employment Growth Unemployment Rate
1987 1.7 0.6 5.6
1988 3.2 0.7 5.3
1989 4.2 1.4 5
1990 4.7 2.8 5.4
1991 3.3 2.8 5.8
Source: Statistics Austria.
Table 1: 
The Austrian labor market 1987-1991Thus, in the data it is possible to distinguish four groups of job seekers. The ﬁrst group comprises job
seekers with monthly income exceeding 12,610 AS who are aged 40 or older with much previous work
experience (6 out of previous 10 years and 9 out of previous 15 years). This group is eligible for the
change to the potential duration of beneﬁts (ePBD group). The second group consists of job seekers
with income exceeding 12,610 AS and age less than 40 years or age exceeding 40 years but with little
work experience. This group beneﬁts from the increase in the gross replacement rate (eRR group). The
third group contains job seekers with income lower than 12,610 AS and aged 40 or older with much
previous work experience. This group is aﬀected by both, the increase in the beneﬁt replacement rate
and the increase in the potential beneﬁt duration (ePBDRR group). The fourth group contains job
seekers with income exceeding 12,610 AS who are young or older job seekers with little work experience.
For those individuals there was no change in the two central parameters of the unemployment insurance
system (Control group).
Table 2 about here
Table 3 reports the means of the RR and of the PBD together with the number of spells in the
respective groups both before August 1989 and after August 1989. The ﬁrst row in Table 3 shows that
almost all job seekers entering unemployment before August 1989 in the ePBD group were eligible for
the maximum duration of regular beneﬁts of 30 weeks.8 In contrast, the PBD was almost 43 weeks
for spells in the ePBD group after the policy change. Thus, this group experienced an increase by
13.5 weeks in the PBD. The second row in Table 3 shows that there is a slight increase in the beneﬁt
replacement rate. This increase is due to the fact that there is a second policy change in June 1990
aﬀecting the high income workers in the ePBD group. The third row in Table 3 shows that this group
is the largest in size, and that the number of spells in the ePBD group increases. However, note that
this probably reﬂects the fact that eligibility to the change in the RR depends on previous income in
nominal terms rather than the fact that more individuals register to collect unemployment insurance
because beneﬁts are more generous. In line with economic growth over the period 1987-1991 (Table 1),
the total number of spells is almost identical before and after the policy change.
Table 3 about here
The second set of rows in Table 3 refers to the eRR group. PBD is lower on average in the RR
group than in the PBD group. This reﬂects the fact that many spells in the RR group do not fulﬁll the
30 week requirement that at least 60 % out of the previous 5 years have to be spent working. While
there is virtually no change to PBD, the beneﬁt replacement rate increases strongly, from 41 % to 47 %.
This group is smaller than the ﬁrst group reﬂecting the fact that median income in the unemployment
inﬂow is higher than the nominal income threshold of 12,610 AS. The decrease in the number of spells
in the group is due to the fact that previous income must be below a nominally ﬁxed income threshold
in order to be a member of the RR group.
The third set of rows in Table 3 refers to the ePBD RR group. This group very much resembles
a combination of the ePBD and of the eRR group exhibiting long potential beneﬁt duration as in the
8The empirical analysis below accounts for the fact that the all unemployment insurance parameters may vary due to
the fact that the changes enacted in August 1989 pertain to all spells, not just to those started after August 1989.
10little much little much
<= 12,610 AS eRR eRR eRR ePBD_RR
> 12,610 AS Control Control Control ePBD
Notes:
Eligibility (e) for Change to the Replacement Rate (RR) and for Change to Potential Benefit Duration (PBD) 
Table 2:
Worked "little" refers to less than 6 out of previous 10 years and less than 9 out of previous 15 years
work experience. Worked "much" refers to worked more than 6 out of previous 10 and worked more















PBD (weeks) 29.5 42.5 13.0 13.5
RR (%) 40.0 40.9 0.9 -0.3
N 48294 51110
eRR group
PBD (weeks) 25.1 24.6 -0.5 0.0
RR (%) 41.4 47.3 5.9 4.6
N 17160 15310
ePBD_RR group
PBD (weeks) 29.0 42.6 13.6 14.1
RR (%) 41.3 47.0 5.7 4.4
N 11992 9182
Control group
PBD (weeks) 27.4 26.9 -0.5 --
RR (%) 40.2 41.5 1.3 --
N 33815 38958
Total
PBD (weeks) 28.1 34.8 6.7 --
RR (%) 40.4 42.5 2.0 --
N 111261 114560
Notes:
Source: Own calculations, based on Austrian Social Security Data.
The changes to unemployment insurance in August 1989
Table 3:  
PBD=potential benefit duration. RR=benefit replacement rate. ePBD=eligible for 
increase in potential benefit duration; eRR=eligible for increase in benefit replacement 
rate. ePBD_RR=eligible for both.ePBD group, and a rather high replacement rate of 41 % as in the eRR group. Interestingly, this group
experiences an increase in the PBD and in the RR in exactly the same magnitude as both previously
discussed groups. This is the smallest group. Again, the number of spells allocated to this group
declines since all individuals must have earned less than the nominal income threshold of 12,610 AS in
order to be allocated to the ePBD RR group.
The fourth set of rows in Table 3 refers to the control group. This second largest group has rather
long PBD and relatively low RR before the policy change. There is a slight decrease in the PBD over
time, and a slight increase in the RR (reﬂecting the policy change in June 1990) over time.
The last column in Table 3 reports diﬀ-in-diﬀ estimates of the eﬀect of the policy change on both
parameters of the unemployment compensation system. This column shows that a corresponding diﬀ-
in-diﬀ calculation for some outcome, identiﬁes the eﬀect of extending the PBD by 14 weeks (starting
from 30 weeks), the eﬀect of increasing the RR by 4.6 percentage points (starting from 41 %), and the
eﬀect of increasing both PBD by 14 weeks and increasing the RR by 4.4 percentage points. Thus, this
design allows for an exhaustive analysis of how ﬁnancial incentives aﬀect the duration of unemployment.
4.3 Unemployment Duration
Table 4 reports average unemployment duration in the ﬁrst 104 weeks by program implementation status
and by group.9 Let tu denote the realized duration of unemployment measured in weeks. Unemployment
duration in the ﬁrst two years is t104
u ≡ min(tu,104).
Table 4 about here
The ﬁrst column in Table 4 shows that average unemployment duration is longest in the ePBD RR
group and shortest in the Control group in spells that started before August 1989. The second column
in Table 4 shows average unemployment duration after August 1989. The third column in Table 4 shows
that unemployment duration increases in all groups. However, as column four in Table 4 shows, the
change in unemployment stronger in groups which are eligible for either the change to PBD or RR or
both. For instance, unemployment duration increases by 1.13 weeks more strongly in the ePBD group
that is eligible for the extension of PBD but not for the increase in RR. There is a slightly weaker
increase by .96 weeks in unemployment duration in the eRR group which is eligible for the increase in
RR but not for the extension of PBD. The strongest eﬀect is in the group that is eligible for both RR
and PBD. In the ePBD RR group, unemployment duration increases by 3.25 weeks more strongly than
in the Control group. Furthermore, there appears to be an excess increase of 1.16 weeks (=3.25-1.13-
0.96) in unemployment duration in the sense that this eﬀect exceeds the sum of the eﬀects reported in
the ePBD and in the eRR groups.
4.4 Survivor Functions
Job search theory predicts that ﬁnancial incentives in UI aﬀect the shape of the unemployment exit
hazard depending on the time to beneﬁt exhaustion. In order to study this prediction, it is useful to
9We report average unemployment in the ﬁrst 104 weeks for two reasons. First, we will calculate the contribution to
the total change as a function of elapsed unemployment duration. Second, right-censoring is not an issue in the ﬁrst 104










ePBD group 16.25 18.67 2.42 1.13
(0.08) (0.09) (0.12) (0.18)
48294 51110
eRR group 17.79 20.03 2.24 0.96
(0.12) (0.16) (0.20) (0.24)
17160 15310
ePBD_RR group 19.01 23.55 4.53 3.25
(0.17) (0.24) (0.29) (0.32)
11992 9182
Control group 15.24 16.52 1.29 --
(0.08) (0.09) (0.13)
33815 38958
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses.
Source: Own calculations, based on Austrian Social Security Data.
Table 4:  
Average Unemployment Duration in First 104 Weeks 
(measured in weeks)decompose the eﬀect on average unemployment duration reported in Table 4 as follows. It is well known






0 θ(x)dx) is the survivor function, that is, the probability that unemployment spells are
longer than z weeks, and where θ(x) is the unemployment exit hazard, i.e. θ(x) =
f(x)
S(x) where f(x)
is the density of unemployment spells (Lancaster, 1990). This says, for instance, that the increase in
average unemployment duration in the ePBD group by 2.42 weeks is due to the fact that the survivor
function in the ePBD group after August 1989 was higher than the corresponding survivor function in
the ePBD group based on spells that started before August 1989. Moreover, the diﬀerence in these
survivor functions integrates to 2.42 weeks. Thus, analyzing the eﬀect of the policy change on survivor
functions allows decomposing the total change in unemployment duration into contributions to this
change as a function of duration.10
Figure 3 shows the Kaplan-Meier survivor functions for the four groups. The top left subﬁgure
contrasts the survivor function after the policy change with the survivor before the policy change in the
ePBD group. Clearly, after 15 weeks of elapsed unemployment duration, the survivor function after the
policy change starts to diverge from the corresponding function before the policy change. The diﬀerence
widens until about 40 weeks have elapsed. After this point the diﬀerence becomes smaller again and
stays constant at a low level after 65 weeks of elapsed duration. Thus, extending the PBD appears to
create a ’lens’ that starts 15 weeks before beneﬁt exhaustion in the old system and that ends about 15
weeks after beneﬁt exhaustion takes place in the new system.
Figure 3 about here
The top right subﬁgure in Figure 3 reports the diﬀerence in the survivor functions in the eRR group.
In contrast to the previous ﬁndings, we note an ever so slight increase in the survivor function that takes
place almost from the start of the unemployment spell. The diﬀerence between the survivor functions
becomes larger after 20 weeks of unemployment duration have elapsed, and again after 30 weeks have
elapsed. The survivor function remains at a higher level than before the policy change even in the
period when beneﬁts have been exhausted, after week 30.
The bottom left subﬁgure in Figure 3 reports the survivor function analysis for the ePBD RR group.
This ﬁgure very clearly combines aspects of both policy changes. On one hand, we note a relatively
strong increase in the survivor function right from the start of the unemployment spell. Again, there a
’lens’ starts to appear after 15 weeks of unemployment duration which disappears only after 65 weeks
of unemployment duration have elapsed.
The bottom right panel reports the survivor functions in the ’control’ group. There is no diﬀerence
at all in the survivor functions up to 20 weeks of unemployment duration. Thereafter we note a
slight upward shift in the survivor function. Thus, in order to isolate the eﬀects of the changes to the
unemployment compensation system in August 1989, it is necessary to net out the change occurring
over time from the raw eﬀects on the survivor functions in the previous three subﬁgures.
10Note that elapsed unemployment duration is not time to beneﬁt exhaustion. However, recall that in the old system,
only two levels of the PBD prevailed, i.e. 20 weeks and 30 weeks. Thus, elapsed duration is very closely related to time
to beneﬁt exhaustion.
12Notes: before = spell starts before August 1989, after=spell starts after August 1989
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no treatment4.5 Exit Hazards
Figure 4 reports the Kaplan-Meier estimates of the unemployment exit hazard by period and group.
The top, left subﬁgure refers to the ePBD group. The unemployment exit rate before the policy change
(dashed line) is very low at the start of the unemployment spell, reaches a maximum of .1 per week after
20 weeks of unemployment have elapsed and declines gradually to a very low level. Interestingly, there
is an important spike in the unemployment exit rate in week 30 – the week when regular unemployment
beneﬁts are exhausted for almost all individuals in this group. This replicates the important ﬁndings in
Meyer (1990). There are two important diﬀerences between the unemployment exit rate before August
1989 and the corresponding rate after August 1989. First, the spike that was observed in week 30
”moves” to weeks 39 and 52. Second, the unemployment exit rate is strongly depressed in the period
from week 20 and ending in week 40. This is the period just before exhaustion in the old system and
in between old and new exhaustion weeks.
Figure 4 about here
The exit rate in the eRR group is characterized by two spikes in the old system in week 20 and in
week 30 (top, right subﬁgure). In the new system, the exit rate appears to be slightly depressed from
the start of the unemployment spell. Thus, an important diﬀerence between changes to PBD and to
RR emerges. Whereas the exit rate in the ﬁrst part of the unemployment spell appears to be unaﬀected
with changes to PBD, the exit rate is depressed from the start with changes to RR.
The combined eﬀects of RR and PBD can potentially be studied in the bottom, left subﬁgure
(ePBD RR group). In the old system, the unemployment exit rate is rather low until 30 weeks of
regular beneﬁts have elapsed. In the new system, we observe a depressed hazard from the start of the
spell. Moreover, whereas the unemployment exit rate shoots upward between week 30 and week 40
in the old system, the exit rate is strongly depressed in the corresponding period in the new system.
Furthermore, there are two notable spikes centered after 39 weeks and 52 weeks in the new system.
The remaining subﬁgure shows the unemployment exit rate for the group that was not aﬀected in
August 1989. We note that even though there was no change to unemployment insurance parameters in
this group, the exit rate after August 1989 appears to be lower from 10 weeks until 65 weeks of elapsed
unemployment duration. There are at least two reasons for this reduction in the exit rate. First, real
GDP growth was lower in 1991 than in 1990 (Table 1). Second, in June 1990 this group was aﬀected
by a slight increase in the beneﬁt level. Both factors may have contributed to a lower unemployment
exit hazard after August 1989 compared to the period before August 1989.
This descriptive analysis already provides important insights into the mechanism by which ﬁnancial
incentives in UI aﬀect unemployment duration. However, a number of important aspects were not
accommodated so far. First, job search theory models the unemployment exit hazard for homogeneous
workers. We, however, have discussed unemployment exit rates that refer to very heterogeneous groups
of job seekers. It has been show that failure to account for heterogeneity biases the duration dependence
of the unemployment exit hazard and, potentially, the eﬀects of ﬁnancial incentives on unemployment.
Second, the change to PBD is heterogeneous: PBD increases by 9 weeks for workers aged 40-49 years,
and by 22 weeks for workers aged 50 years and older. These problems will be addressed in the context
13Notes: before = spell starts before August 1989, after=spell starts after August 1989
Source: Own calculations, based on Austrian Social Security Data.
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no treatmentof an econometric model of the unemployment exit rate in the following section.
5 Results
5.1 Statistical model
To estimate how ﬁnancial incentives aﬀect the unemployment exit hazard, we apply a proportional
hazard model.11 The proportional hazard model posits the following speciﬁcation for the exit rate
θ(tu|x) = λ(tu)exp(xβ), where λ(tu) captures the baseline duration dependence of the hazard (in
weeks), and x are the observed characteristics of the individuals.12 The baseline duration dependence
is of central interest in this paper because it refers to the exit rate for a homogeneous group of workers.





λlI(4l < tu ≤ 4(l + 1)) + λ15I(tu > 60)) (1)
Thus, the hazard rate shifts every 4 weeks interval. Because there are very few transitions beyond
week 60 the last time interval covers the entire remaining duration of the spell as of week 60 .
The treatment eﬀect can be identiﬁed in a (log) diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence setting. Denote eligibility for
the extension of PBD from 30 weeks to 39 weeks by eP39 = I(ePBD = 1,age < 50), eligibility for an
extension to 52 weeks is denoted by eP52 = I(ePBD = 1,age ≥ 50). Second, introduce the calendar
time varying function A89(tc) = I(tc ≥ mdy(8,1,1989)) where tc measures calendar time in days since
Jan 1, 1960, and mdy(x,y,z) gives the number of days since Jan 1, 1960 of day y in month x and year
z. The function A89(tc) records the moment a spell enters the period after the policy change has taken
place. Thus, the interaction term eP39 ∗ A89(tc) indicates that an individual satisfying all eligibility
criteria for the extension to 39 weeks has entered the period when this policy change has been enacted.
The duration dependence of the hazard rate is speciﬁed as follows13
λl = β0l + β1leP39 + β2leP52 + β3leRR +
+ β4l(eP39 + eP52) ∗ eRR + β5lA89 +
+ δ1leP39 ∗ A89 + δ2leP52 ∗ A89 + δ3leRR ∗ A89 + (2)
+ δ4leP39 ∗ eRR ∗ A89 + δ5leP52 ∗ eRR ∗ A89
l = 0..15
The set of β parameters captures ex ante diﬀerences between groups (β1l,...,β4l), and changes to
duration dependence occurring over time (β5l). Note that we assume that there are no ex ante diﬀerences
11See Van den Berg (2001) for a recent survey of the properties of the mixed proportional hazard model and for
applications of this model to duration data.
12These are age, marital status, female, education, log(previous monthly income), recall status, blue collar, seasonal
industry, manufacturing industry, time spent non-employed, tenure, and quarter of inﬂow. Use of the exp() function
guarantees that the hazard rate is non-negative in the entire domain of xβ.
13For ease of exposition, we suppress dependence of A89(tc) on calendar time tc and write A89.
14between those individuals who are eligible for the change to RR and an extension of PBD from 30 to
39 weeks compared to individuals eligible for the change to RR and the change to PBD from 30 to
52 weeks. The set of δ parameters measure the change in the duration dependence of the hazard rate
due to changes in ﬁnancial incentives. There are ﬁve sets of δ parameters because the policy change
entails 5 interventions (P39, P52, RR, and combinations). δ1l and δ2l capture the eﬀect of extending
PBD, δ3l captures the eﬀect of increasing the gross replacement rate. The parameters δ4l and δ5l test
whether changes to both dimensions of unemployment insurance aﬀect the unemployment exit rate
in a way that would not be expected from two separate changes to one dimension only. Thus, these
parameters address the issue whether increasing the liberality of the unemployment insurance system
simultaneously along the beneﬁt level and the beneﬁt duration dimension generates disincentive eﬀects
beyond the eﬀects that are expected from two uni-dimensional change.
Estimation of the above model follows standard procedure (Lancaster 1990). The conditional hazard
estimates address two important issues. First, the model allows for the diﬀerences across treatments.
Second, the hazard rate is identiﬁed conditional on important diﬀerences across individuals captured
by x. However, unobserved heterogeneity may potentially be important in estimating the eﬀects of
ﬁnancial incentives on the unemployment exit rate. We discuss unobserved heterogeneity below.
5.2 Main Results
Figure 5 presents the main results concerning the eﬀect of ﬁnancial incentives on the unemployment
exit hazard. The ﬁgure reports the eﬀects of changes in the UI parameters on the log exit rate (see
Table A1 for all parameter estimates, standard errors, and z-values). Thus, a reduction in the exit rate
is represented by a negative number, an increase in the exit rate corresponds to a positive number. The
numbers on the x-axis give the midpoint of the respective four week duration interval.
Figure 5 about here
The top left subﬁgure reports the eﬀects of extending the PBD from 30 to 39 weeks. Increasing
potential beneﬁt duration tends to leave unaﬀected the unemployment exit rate until 16 weeks of
unemployment duration have elapsed. In week 30 (the old exhaustion period), the hazard rate in the
new system is much lower than the hazard rate in the old system. Thereafter the hazard rate in the
new system increases strongly compared to the corresponding rate in the old system. In weeks 42-50 –
when beneﬁts have expired also in the new system – the unemployment exit hazard is much higher than
before the policy change. This can be taken as evidence for the entitlement eﬀect discussed in Figure 1.
From week 54 onwards, there is no eﬀect of extending potential beneﬁt duration on the unemployment
exit rate. Thus, the entitlement eﬀect is a transitory phenomenon.
In contrast, extending beneﬁts from 30 to 52 weeks reduces the exit hazard already early on in the
unemployment spell (top, right subﬁgure). With the exception of week 1, the unemployment exit rate
is lower in the new system compared with the old system. The largest reduction occurs, again, in week
30 – the period when beneﬁts expired in the old system. In the period 30 - 54 weeks we observe a rapid
increase of the unemployment exit rate. The unemployment exit rate is much higher in the new system
in week 54 – the period when beneﬁts expire in the new system. Again, the unemployment exit rate
15Notes: x-axis gives the midpoint of the duration interval.
Effects on log Unemployment Exit Rate (Based on Table A1)
Figure 5:
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unemployment duration (weeks)is higher compared to the old system not only in the exhaustion week (54) but also in the week that
follows (58) – in line with the entitlement eﬀect. In week 62 (which covers the entire period from week
60 to the end of the spell) there is no eﬀect of extending the potential beneﬁt duration.
Increasing the beneﬁt replacement rate tends to depress the unemployment exit rate much less
strongly than changing the potential beneﬁt duration (middle subﬁgure). Individuals with access to
more generous unemployment beneﬁts tend to leave unemployment less rapidly in the covered period
(weeks 2 to 30, exceptions are weeks 22 and 26). After beneﬁts have expired for all individuals, there
is no eﬀect on the unemployment exit rate (with the exception of weeks 50 and 62).
Does it matter whether individuals are aﬀected by a combined change instead of two separate changes
to ﬁnancial incentives? The bottom left subﬁgure answers this question by looking at the incremental
eﬀect of RR for the group that experienced a PBD increase of 9 weeks (i.e. in addition to the PBD-eﬀect
shown in the top-left subﬁgure). Results suggest that the hazard rate is slightly (yet insigniﬁcantly)
lower in the ﬁrst four week interval. Thereafter, all coeﬃcients that reﬂect the incremental eﬀect of a
combined intervention turn out to be insigniﬁcant (with the exception of the coeﬃcient for week 18).
The bottom right subﬁgure shows the incremental eﬀect of RR for the group which experienced a 22
week in increase in PBD (i.e. in addition to the PBD-eﬀect shown in the top-right subﬁgure). Results
indicate that combining a 22-week beneﬁt extension with an increase in the replacement rate decreases
the exit rate in the early period of the spell (weeks 2 and 6). Thereafter, the eﬀects are insigniﬁcant
(except for weeks 18 and 26). Thus, the overall impression from the hazard rate estimates is that
there are no additional disincentive eﬀects arising from a two-dimensional intervention compared to two
separate changes to just one dimension of UI beneﬁts. However, note that the small downward shifts
in the hazard rate in the early period of the spell may imply strong eﬀects on the population survivor
function and on expected duration – a point we discuss below in detail.
Summarizing our hazard rate results, we ﬁnd that the eﬀect of increasing potential beneﬁt duration
by 9 or by 22 weeks are in line with predictions from job search theory. The unemployment exit hazard
is aﬀected in a non-monotonic way by increases in potential beneﬁt duration. In the ﬁrst part of
the unemployment spell, there is a weak reduction in the exit hazard. The strongest negative eﬀects
arise around the period when unemployment beneﬁts used to be exhausted in the old system. The
intermittent period – from the old exhaustion week until the new exhaustion week – is characterized by
a rapid increase of the hazard. The exit hazard is signiﬁcantly higher than the counterfactual without
beneﬁt extension for some weeks before but also for additional weeks after beneﬁts have been exhausted
in the new system. In contrast, with few exceptions, increasing the beneﬁt replacement rate tends to
reduce the unemployment exit hazard throughout the unemployment spell.
So far we have discussed hazard rate estimates. These are important because job search theory
oﬀers sharp predictions regarding the impact of unemployment insurance parameters on the exit hazard.
However, labor market policy is more interested in the implied eﬀects on unemployment durations or
– equivalently – eﬀects on survivor functions. Figure 6 reports the diﬀerence in the factual survivor
function with treatment to the counterfactual survivor function without treatment. Speciﬁcally, in
the ﬁrst step we estimate the survivor function with treatment for each individual as implied by the
hazard rate estimates b S1i(tu|xi) = exp(−
R t
0
b θ1(z|xi)dz) with tu = 0,4,..,56,60,100. The corresponding
16survivor function without treatment is b S0i(tu|xi) = exp(−
R t
0
b θ0(z|xi)dz). The counterfactual hazard
rate without treatment is obtained by imposing all treatment eﬀects δ to be zero. This gives the change
to the survivor function in the treated group at the individual level. In the second step, we average this
change with respect to the distribution of individual characteristics xi in the population receiving the
treatment. This gives the change in the population survivor function reported in Figure 6.
Figure 6 about here
Extending potential beneﬁt duration by 9 weeks entails a positive contribution to the change in
expected unemployment duration in the time period between 20 weeks and 50 weeks (top, left subﬁgure).
Both, the periods before 20 weeks of elapsed duration, and the period after 50 weeks of duration have
elapsed do not contribute to increasing expected duration. The maximum contribution arises in week
35 – exactly in between the old beneﬁt exhaustion week (30) and the new beneﬁt exhaustion week (40).
Results are similar in qualitative respects but diﬀerent in quantitative respects for an increase of
PBD by 22 weeks (top, right subﬁgure). Again, the unemployment spell can be divided in three periods.
From week 0 to week 12, the contribution to expected unemployment duration is slightly negative, from
week 12 to week 60, the contribution is strongly positive, and from week 60 onwards, the contribution
to expected unemployment duration is positive but small. Again, the maximum contribution occurs at
week 40 which is roughly in between the old exhaustion week (30) and the new exhaustion week (52).
However, the strongest diﬀerence lies in the magnitude of the contribution. Whereas extending duration
by 9 weeks generates a maximum contribution on the order of 2.5 percentage points, the corresponding
maximum contribution due to a 22 week increase exceeds 5 percentage points.
In contrast to beneﬁt duration extensions, an increase in the beneﬁt replacement rate generates a
positive contribution to expected unemployment duration right from the start of the unemployment
spell (middle subﬁgure). Most of the prolonging contribution occurs in the covered period of the
unemployment spell (weeks 0 to 30). There is also a positive but much less strong contribution to
expected unemployment duration in the period that is no longer covered by regular unemployment
beneﬁts (week 30 onwards).
The bottom two subﬁgures report results for interventions that increase PBD as well as RR. Two
interesting results emerge in comparison with the solitary change to potential beneﬁt duration (top two
subﬁgures). First, the contribution to expected unemployment duration is positive from the start of the
unemployment spell. This is clearly the impact of the replacement rate on top of the potential beneﬁt
duration eﬀect. Second, the maximum contribution to expected unemployment duration increases
strongly from 2.5 percentage points to more than 4 percentage points (PBD 30-39 weeks), and from 6
percentage points to almost 14 percentage points (PBD 30-52 weeks).
Table 5 about here
To indicate the eﬀects of the changes in ﬁnancial incentives Table 5 shows the average unemployment
duration in the ﬁrst 104 weeks of the unemployment spell.14 The ﬁrst column in Table 5 gives the factual
14We report expected unemployment duration in the ﬁrst 104 weeks because, in order to estimate total expected
unemployment duration we need to know the survivor function until inﬁnity. Since inference on the survivor function
tends to become ever more unreliable as we extend the duration of the unemployment spell, we arbitrarily limit our
17Notes: x-axis gives the end of the duration interval. Difference refers to the end of the duration interval.
Source: Own calculations, based on Austrian Social Security Data.
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PBD 30-52 weeks and RR IncreaseTreated Control Effect
No treatment 16.91 16.91 0.00
Change to One Parameter
PBD 30-39 weeks 17.53 17.08 0.45
PBD 30-52 weeks 20.62 18.35 2.27
RR increase 20.97 20.60 0.38
Change to Two Parameters
PBD 30-39 and RR increase 21.95 21.09 0.86
PBD 30-52 and RR increase 29.43 23.70 5.72
Notes: Based on population receiving the treatment in the period after the policy change.
Source: Own calculations, based on Austrian Social Security Data.
Table 5:
Simulated Effects on Expected Duration in First 104 Weeksexpected unemployment duration with treatment for the ﬁve treated groups and the group that is not
aﬀected by an intervention in August 1989.15 The second column in Table 5 gives the counterfactual
expected unemployment duration without treatment for the ﬁve treated groups. The third column gives
the eﬀect of the interventions on expected unemployment duration.16
Extending the potential beneﬁt duration by 9 weeks tends to increase expected unemployment
duration by .45 weeks or by .05 weeks per additional week of PBD (second row). Increasing PBD
by 22 weeks generates about 2.3 additional weeks of unemployment (third row). Thus, the second
PBD extension produces twice as many weeks of unemployment per additional week of PBD (.10).
As discussed in Section 2, this result is in line with previous ﬁndings regarding the eﬀect of PBD
on unemployment duration and similar to for example Lalive and Zweimueller (2004a) who ﬁnd a
disincentive eﬀect of .05 weeks per additional week of PBD. In contrast, increasing RR by 6 percentage
points tends to prolong unemployment duration by .38 weeks (fourth row). This implies an elasticity of
unemployment duration with respect to the RR of about 0.15, which is small compared to the results
of other studies discussed in Section 2.
Individuals who are targeted with a combined 9 week increase to PBD and a 6 percentage point
increase in RR are unemployed for .86 weeks longer than in the counterfactual situation without this
combined intervention (ﬁfth row). Interestingly, this change to unemployment duration equals almost
exactly to the prediction obtained from two separate changes, i.e. .38+.45=.83. Individuals who get
both a 22 week increase in PBD and a 6 percentage point increase in RR are unemployed much longer
than in the counterfactual situation of no intervention (5.7 weeks, sixth row). Note that the ’adding up
result’ no longer obtains for this group of individuals, i.e. 2.27+.38=2.65 weeks instead of 5.7 weeks.
This result manifests itself already in Figure 6. Whereas the survivor curve diﬀerence in the case ’PBD
30-39 weeks and RR Increase’ is approximately the sum of ’PBD 30-39 weeks’ and ’RR Increase’, this
is not true for the case ’PBD 30-52 weeks and RR Increase’. Thus, the excess eﬀect of combined
interventions on unemployment duration appears to originate predominantly from a generous increase
in PBD with a generous increase in RR.
discussion to the ﬁrst 104 weeks which are quite well identiﬁed in our large dataset. Expected unemployment duration is
obtained by integrating the population survivor function with respect to time up to 104 weeks.
15Recall that average unemployment duration in the control group is 16.5 weeks in the period after 1989 (Table 4).
The corresponding number implied by the econometric model is 16.9 weeks (top, left cell). This is strong evidence that
the econometric model ﬁts the data well. The resulting diﬀerence is due to the fact that average unemployment duration
treats spells which are right-censored in the ﬁrst 104 weeks as completed whereas the econometric model accounts for
right-censoring.
16Note that the simulation results in Table 5 give the ’eﬀect of treatment on the treated’. A concern with these
simulations is that the treated groups diﬀer very strongly from the average unemployed individual. We can discuss this
concern by using the eﬀects identiﬁed in the treated group to forecast potential eﬀects of each treatment on all individuals.
This results in slightly weaker eﬀects than those reported in Table 6 (results are available upon request from the authors).
This is due to the fact that the large group of ’non-treated’ individuals is characterized by rapid exit from unemployment.
Note, however, that using the eﬀects identiﬁed in the treated group to forecast eﬀects for the entire population is valid if
and only if the job search environment is similar across groups.
185.3 Sensitivity Analysis
Table 6 discusses unobserved heterogeneity, seasonal workers, and exits to jobs. Because the model
allows for eﬀects on the entire duration dependence of the unemployment exit rate, comparing hazard
rate coeﬃcient estimates is not informative. Therefore, we base our discussion of the sensitivity of the
main result on a time average of the change in the population survivor function reported in Figure
6. Speciﬁcally, we calculate the average with respect to time of the change in the population survivor
function after 0, 4, ..., 60 weeks of unemployment duration.17 Table 6 reports the time and population
average diﬀerence of the survivor function with treatment and the survivor function without treatment.
Table 6 about here
The results suggest that the survivor function is .63 percentage points higher with additional 9 weeks
of PBD, it is higher by 3.17 percentage points with an additional 22 weeks of PBD, it is .56 percentage
points higher with more beneﬁts, and 1.28 percentage points higher in the combined intervention plus
9 weeks PBD plus 6 percentage points RR, and it increases strongest, by 8.17 percentage points, in the
combined intervention that adds 22 weeks to PBD and 6 percentage points to RR.
The second column in Table 6 discusses the sensitivity of our results with respect to unobserved
heterogeneity.18 We deal with unobserved heterogeneity by allowing for a discrete distribution of unob-
served heterogeneity with two masspoints (Heckman and Singer 1984). This approach can be thought of
as an approximation to the true distribution of unobservables across individuals. The estimates suggest
that unobserved heterogeneity is relevant as indicated by the strong change in the log Likelihood. Nev-
ertheless, the implied changes of the population survivor function are quite similar to those displayed in
our main results. For instance, whereas the main results suggest that the average change to the survivor
function is on the order of .63 percentage points, the results that allow for unobserved heterogeneity
indicate an average change of .62 percentage points. The results are not as similar for the other four
interventions. However, in all cases results that allow for unobserved heterogeneity imply a stronger
eﬀect of changes in ﬁnancial incentives on the population survivor function. Thus, our main results can
be interpreted as giving the lower bound of the true eﬀects of ﬁnancial incentives on unemployment
duration.
In Austria, the construction sector and the tourism sector – two sectors characterized by strongly
seasonal employment – contribute disproportionately to the inﬂow into unemployment. Whereas al-
most 50 % of the unemployment inﬂow belongs to these two sectors, the corresponding proportion in
employment is on the order of only 15 %. This suggests performing our main analysis in a sub-sample
that excludes seasonal workers in order to see their impact on estimated results. The third column in
Table 6 indicates that the presence of seasonal workers has a more important eﬀect on results than
unobserved heterogeneity. Interestingly, changes to potential beneﬁt duration seem to have stronger
disincentive eﬀects on non-seasonal workers than changes to the beneﬁt replacement rate. This can be
seen in two ways. First, when comparing solitary interventions this conclusion arises directly (PBD
17We average with respect to the value of the survivor function in the ﬁrst 60 weeks because in this period the diﬀerence
in the survivor function is largest. Thus, if there are diﬀerences in results, we expect to see these diﬀerences more strongly
in a time average containing the ﬁrst 60 weeks compared to a time average containing the entire real axis.










PBD 30-39 weeks 0.63 0.62 1.24 0.68
PBD 30-52 weeks 3.17 3.51 5.18 3.29
RR Increase 0.56 0.73 -0.08 0.43
PBD 30-39 weeks and RR Increase 1.28 1.84 1.75 0.83
PBD 30-52 weeks and RR Increase 8.17 9.48 8.55 8.30
-log Likelihood 792903 789558 464322 700449
Number of Observations 225821 225821 123756 225821
Notes: Based on population receiving the treatment in the period after the policy change.
Source: Own calculations, based on Austrian Social Security Data.
Survivor Curve with Treatment - Survivor Curve without Treatment in First 60 Weeks 
(Average; Percentage Points)
Table 6:30-39 weeks and PBD 30-52 weeks eﬀects almost double compared to main results, RR has positive
eﬀect in the main results but zero eﬀect in non-seasonal results). Second, the additional change to the
population survivor function generated by increasing RR in addition to the PBD intervention is much
stronger in our main results than in the non-seasonal worker sample (compare ﬁrst row with fourth
row, and second row with ﬁfth row). This suggests that seasonal workers are less sensitive to changes
in potential beneﬁt duration but more sensitive to changes in the level of beneﬁts than non-seasonal
workers. A potential explanation for this ﬁnding builds on our ﬁndings above. We have shown above
that changes to potential beneﬁt duration only weakly depress the exit hazard in the beginning whereas
changes to the replacement rate immediately reduce the exit rate. Thus, lower sensitivity to PBD and
higher sensitivity to RR for seasonal workers is in line with a priori reasoning since unemployment spells
are much shorter for seasonal workers. We nevertheless believe that it is important to work with our
main results because over-representation of seasonal workers in unemployment holds for many countries
not only for Austria.
Job search theory derives predictions in a world where individuals choose between accepting a job
or remaining unemployed for an additional period (Mortensen, 1977). In Austrian reality, however, job
seekers have additional options that lead out of unemployment, such as the illness insurance system,
training, leaving registered unemployment. These options are taken up by roughly 14 % of job seekers in
our sample. Thus, it is important to investigate the extent to which our main results are driven by the
process that refers to non-job exits. We do this by estimating the transition rate from unemployment
to regular jobs. We then report the change to the (purely hypothetical) population survivor function
that would prevail if non-job exits did not exist, i.e. disregarding entirely the non-job exits. Again, we
report the (time) average change in this job survivor function. Results in Column 4 of Table 6 show
that non-job exits are not driving our main result (with the exception of the ’PBD 30-39 weeks plus
RR’ intervention).
5.4 Disincentive Eﬀects
This ﬁnal sub-section compares the disincentive eﬀects of changes in PBD and changes in RR. Since such
a comparison needs a common denominator we study the eﬀects in terms of average beneﬁt payments.
In this comparison our line of reasoning is the following. Suppose a policy maker proposes to increase
the beneﬁt replacement rate. This will directly increase expected beneﬁt payments in the time period
covered by regular unemployment insurance even if individuals do not change their job search behavior.
We denote the expected beneﬁt payments in the new system that do not reﬂect behavioral changes
the ex ante expected beneﬁt payment. As we have shown so far, actual expenditures of unemployment
insurance will be higher than expected since individuals have lower exit rates due to higher beneﬁt
payments. We denote the expected beneﬁt payment that reﬂects both, the direct ﬁnancial eﬀect and
the indirect behavioral eﬀect, the ex post beneﬁt payment. An intuitively appealing measure relates
the diﬀerence between ex post and ex ante payments to the diﬀerence between ex ante payments and
payments before the policy change. This measure gives the behavioral eﬀect of changes to unemployment
insurance in relation to the pure ﬁnancing eﬀects of changes to unemployment insurance.
Speciﬁcally, we estimate expected cost at the individual level in the old system as the product of
20unemployment beneﬁt b0i times expected duration of unemployment in the covered period
R E0i
0 S0i(t)dt,
where S0i(t) ≡ S0(t|xi is the counterfactual survivor function without the policy change.19 The ex ante
expected beneﬁt payment is b1i
R E1i
0 S0i(t)dt. Note ﬁrst that ex ante beneﬁt payments do not reﬂect
behavioral changes because we work with the counterfactual survivor function without treatment S0i(t)
to estimate expected duration, and second that E1i > E0i and b1i = b0i in the ePBD group, and
E1i = E0i and b1i > b0i in the eRR group. The ex post expected beneﬁt payment is b1i
R E1i
0 S1i(t)dt.
Thus, ex post beneﬁt payments reﬂect both the ﬁnancial eﬀects and the behavioral eﬀects of changes to
unemployment insurance parameters. The disincentive measure we report in Table 7 is the diﬀerence
between ex post and ex ante payments relative to the diﬀerence between ex ante payments and payments

































This measure gives the additional cost to unemployment insurance solely due to behavioral changes
((S1i − S0i)(t)) per unit of increase in the unemployment insurance without behavioral changes.
Table 7 gives the increase in beneﬁt payments due to changes in UI parameters in percent of expected
beneﬁt payments in the old system (Column A); the increase in beneﬁt payments due to behavior
(Column B), and the disincentive eﬀect (Column C).
Table 7
Increasing the covered period of the unemployment spell by 9 weeks would have generated an average
increase in cost of about 9.5 percent without behavioral eﬀects. However, because job seekers adjust
their behavior, there is a second, behavioral eﬀect on total costs on the order of 2.1 percent of the
original payments. Thus, the disincentive eﬀect due to a 33 percent increase in PBD is roughly 22 %.
The direct ﬁnancial consequence of extending PBD by 22 weeks is about 17 percent of the original
payments. This is slightly less than the direct eﬀect of the smaller beneﬁt extension because the
contribution to expected beneﬁt payments decreases with elapsed duration. Again, there is a second
eﬀect on expected costs due to changes in behavior on the order of 14 percent of original payments.
This generates a disincentive eﬀect of 82 %. Clearly, the disincentive eﬀect of a generous extension of
potential beneﬁt duration is much larger than the disincentive eﬀect due to a moderate extension of
beneﬁt duration. This result arises, primarily, due to a disproportionate change in the behavioral eﬀect
– this eﬀect is 7 times larger for the 22 week extension compared to the 9 week extension.
In contrast, increasing the beneﬁt replacement rate does not entail strong disincentive eﬀects. Ad-
ditional payments due to behavioral changes amount to merely 11 % of the increase in payments due
to UI parameters (Row 3, Column C).
19Note that b = Bw where B is the gross replacement rate and w is gross weekly income. Moreover, this ex ante
expected cost measure does not account for unemployment assistance payments which are available after unemployment
beneﬁts have run out. The data do not contain information on unemployment assistance. Also, results are qualitatively
not sensitive to using imputed unemployment assistance payments.
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Change to One Parameter
PBD 30-39 weeks 9.5 2.1 22.0
PBD 30-52 weeks 16.8 13.9 82.4
RR increase 13.9 1.6 11.2
Change to Two Parameters
PBD 30-39 and RR increase 24.0 4.5 18.6
PBD 30-52 and RR increase 34.7 33.2 95.8
Notes: Based on population receiving the treatment in the period after the policy change.
Source: Own calculations, based on Austrian Social Security Data.
Simulated Effects on Average Benefit Payments
(In Percent of Payments in Old System)
Table 7:
Increase In Cost Due ToRows 4 and 5 in Table 7 discuss the disincentive eﬀects from combined interventions. Again, a
moderate combined intervention generates much weaker disincentive eﬀects than a combined strong
beneﬁt extension (18 % vs. 96 %). Second, there are no excess eﬀects due to a combination of
higher beneﬁt replacement rates with a moderate 9 week extension. This result holds because the
disincentive eﬀect of the combined intervention, 18 %, is only slightly higher than the disincentive eﬀect
generated by the summing the RR with the PBD extension of 16 % (=(2.1+1.6)/(9.5+13.9)*100).20
In contrast, combining a strong extension of beneﬁts with an increase in beneﬁt payments leads to
excess disincentive eﬀects. The disincentive eﬀect obtained by adding the two separate changes is 50 %
(=(13.9+1.6)/(16.8+13.9)*100). The actual disincentive eﬀect is almost twice as strong.
Summarizing these simulations, we note that changes to potential beneﬁt duration appear to gen-
erate stronger disincentive eﬀects than comparable changes to the beneﬁt replacement rate. Second,
combining a strong PBD extension with an increase in the replacement rate generates strong excess
disincentive eﬀects.
6 Conclusions
This paper addresses the issue of how ﬁnancial incentives embedded in the unemployment insurance
system aﬀect the duration of unemployment. This issue is important for a number of reasons. On the
one hand, the years since the turn of the century have witnessed important reforms to unemployment
insurance in many (particularly European) countries. On the other hand, studies of how simultaneous
changes of UI parameters aﬀect the unemployment exit rate are lacking. Hence it is diﬃcult to compare
the relative eﬀects of changes in the policy instruments.
This paper relies on a change to unemployment insurance in the late 1980s in Austria. This reform
lead both to extensions of the potential duration (PBD) of regular unemployment beneﬁts for a ﬁrst
group of individuals; to an increase in the gross replacement rate (RR) for a second group of individuals;
to both extended PBD and higher RR for a third group of individuals; and to no changes for a ﬁnal
group of individuals. This means that it is not only possible to study the relative magnitudes of two
key parameters determining the generosity of unemployment compensation but also to analyze whether
there are excess eﬀects from combined changes in PBD and RR.
Our results indicate ﬁrst that extending the potential duration of beneﬁts and increasing the beneﬁt
replacement rate both tend to reduce unemployment exits in the period that is covered by unemployment
beneﬁts, i.e. before beneﬁt exhaustion. Second, we ﬁnd that the eﬀects of an extension of the potential
duration of unemployment beneﬁts are more detrimental to unemployment duration than the eﬀect of an
increase in the beneﬁt replacement rate. Finally, we compare the eﬀect of a combined increase in PBD
and RR to an isolated increase in PBD. It turns out that whereas there is an excess eﬀect of a combined
intervention on unemployment duration for generous PBD extensions, there is no corresponding excess
20Note that this ”expected disincentive” eﬀect is valid if and only if the eﬀects identiﬁed in the groups aﬀected by only
one policy change also hold for the group aﬀected by two policy changes. This condition may be satisﬁed because the
group with two changes is very similar to the group aﬀected by a change in the RR with respect to previous earnings, and
the combined intervention group is similar to the group aﬀected by a PBD extension with respect to the previous work
history.
22eﬀect for moderate PBD extensions.
23Coeff. Std.Err. z-Value
Age (years) -0.014 0.001 -23.719
Family situation (other)
single 0.156 0.016 9.564
married 0.014 0.017 0.807
divorced -0.107 0.018 -6.048
Female -0.029 0.022 -1.284
female * married -0.084 0.023 -3.639
female * single 0.136 0.025 5.551
female * divorced 0.055 0.025 2.201
Education (compulsory)
apprenticeship -0.053 0.005 -11.605
upper secondary -0.157 0.011 -14.740
tertiary -0.243 0.012 -20.205
Job promised 0.355 0.005 76.984
Previous job characteristics
Blue collar worker 0.395 0.006 64.709
log wage rate 0.116 0.008 15.168
tenure (years, since 1972) -0.006 0.000 -12.031
time not employed / total (previous 10 years) -0.101 0.012 -8.755
Industry (other)
seasonal 0.352 0.005 70.996
manufacturing -0.094 0.006 -15.496
Inflow year (1987)
1988 0.015 0.008 1.853
1989 0.030 0.011 2.810
1990 -0.007 0.014 -0.506
1991 -0.061 0.016 -3.732
Inflow quarter (I)
II 0.014 0.006 2.552
III -0.212 0.007 -29.981
IV -0.233 0.007 -35.064
Duration dependence (weeks)
Constant -4.185 0.061 -68.794
4-7 0.692 0.018 38.784
8-11 1.207 0.017 69.278
12-15 1.406 0.019 74.514
16-19 1.491 0.022 69.172
20-23 1.453 0.026 55.947
24-27 1.269 0.033 37.884
28-31 1.503 0.036 41.871
32-35 1.233 0.050 24.673
36-39 0.856 0.070 12.175
40-43 0.790 0.083 9.480
44-47 0.517 0.108 4.798
48-51 0.423 0.125 3.396
52-55 0.434 0.135 3.218
56-59 0.280 0.164 1.702
60- -0.380 0.047 -8.132
Duration dependence * Eligible for RR Increase
0-3 -0.175 0.033 -5.305
4-7 -0.261 0.032 -8.180
8-11 -0.474 0.035 -13.635
12-15 -0.013 0.036 -0.373
Table A1: 
Coefficient Estimates for Main Results16-19 0.155 0.040 3.842
20-23 0.163 0.051 3.200
24-27 0.317 0.053 5.929
28-31 0.156 0.077 2.013
32-35 0.135 0.110 1.232
36-39 -0.062 0.138 -0.451
40-43 0.142 0.167 0.851
44-47 -0.411 0.234 -1.756
48-51 -0.032 0.222 -0.142
52-55 0.114 0.254 0.449
56-59 -0.251 0.077 -3.271
60-
Duration dependence * Eligible for PBD Increase 30-39
0-3 0.088 0.018 4.853
4-7 -0.030 0.024 -1.244
8-11 -0.060 0.024 -2.522
12-15 0.030 0.025 1.166
16-19 -0.042 0.029 -1.427
20-23 -0.323 0.037 -8.776
24-27 -0.245 0.046 -5.305
28-31 0.075 0.046 1.636
32-35 -0.009 0.065 -0.145
36-39 0.168 0.089 1.895
40-43 -0.032 0.110 -0.290
44-47 0.052 0.137 0.378
48-51 -0.193 0.169 -1.137
52-55 0.110 0.171 0.642
56-59 0.092 0.207 0.442
60- -0.142 0.063 -2.247
Duration dependence * Eligible for PBD Increase 30-52
0-3 -0.090 0.026 -3.459
4-7 0.111 0.034 3.270
8-11 0.105 0.033 3.194
12-15 0.328 0.034 9.553
16-19 0.304 0.039 7.805
20-23 0.043 0.049 0.885
24-27 -0.028 0.063 -0.451
28-31 0.237 0.060 3.939
32-35 -0.091 0.091 -0.995
36-39 0.102 0.122 0.840
40-43 -0.256 0.158 -1.618
44-47 -0.123 0.196 -0.627
48-51 -0.153 0.221 -0.692
52-55 -0.457 0.273 -1.673
56-59 -0.104 0.277 -0.376
60- -0.028 0.070 -0.398
Duration dependence * Eligible for PBD and RR increase
0-3 0.139 0.034 4.122
4-7 -0.028 0.048 -0.586
8-11 -0.207 0.048 -4.338
12-15 -0.163 0.051 -3.216
16-19 -0.434 0.053 -8.185
20-23 -0.320 0.061 -5.210
24-27 -0.356 0.076 -4.663
28-31 -0.264 0.073 -3.635
32-35 0.032 0.104 0.308
36-39 -0.122 0.145 -0.842
40-43 -0.058 0.191 -0.30644-47 -0.022 0.225 -0.098
48-51 0.487 0.306 1.594
52-55 -0.123 0.309 -0.398
56-59 -0.341 0.359 -0.951
60- 0.126 0.109 1.157
Duration dependence * After August 1989
0-3 0.002 0.016 0.150
4-7 -0.035 0.022 -1.585
8-11 0.031 0.021 1.478
12-15 -0.101 0.023 -4.322
16-19 -0.286 0.028 -10.355
20-23 -0.295 0.033 -8.962
24-27 -0.325 0.042 -7.688
28-31 -0.408 0.045 -9.101
32-35 -0.386 0.061 -6.365
36-39 -0.240 0.082 -2.919
40-43 -0.383 0.098 -3.905
44-47 -0.361 0.124 -2.906
48-51 -0.551 0.145 -3.792
52-55 -0.444 0.154 -2.893
56-59 -0.310 0.182 -1.705
60- -0.297 0.050 -5.976
Treatment Effects
RR Increase (=Eligible for RR Increase * After August 1989)
0-3 -0.030 0.024 -1.281
4-7 -0.016 0.041 -0.392
8-11 -0.012 0.038 -0.322
12-15 0.035 0.043 0.828
16-19 -0.105 0.045 -2.361
20-23 0.128 0.049 2.598
24-27 0.093 0.063 1.475
28-31 -0.089 0.067 -1.333
32-35 0.024 0.094 0.254
36-39 -0.032 0.130 -0.249
40-43 -0.009 0.164 -0.056
44-47 -0.179 0.198 -0.906
48-51 0.576 0.263 2.190
52-55 0.074 0.253 0.291
56-59 -0.063 0.285 -0.222
60- 0.231 0.082 2.819
PBD Increase 30-39 (=Eligible for PBD 30-39 * After August 1989)
0-3 -0.030 0.019 -1.551
4-7 0.030 0.030 0.991
8-11 0.053 0.029 1.835
12-15 0.039 0.032 1.216
16-19 -0.083 0.038 -2.157
20-23 -0.077 0.048 -1.593
24-27 -0.064 0.060 -1.065
28-31 -0.551 0.061 -8.975
32-35 -0.293 0.081 -3.609
36-39 0.185 0.103 1.795
40-43 0.445 0.127 3.514
44-47 0.380 0.157 2.423
48-51 0.559 0.193 2.891
52-55 0.120 0.195 0.616
56-59 0.026 0.232 0.111
60- 0.063 0.067 0.949
PBD Increase 30-52 (=Eligible for PBD 30-52 * After August 1989)0-3 0.104 0.026 4.006
4-7 -0.118 0.042 -2.827
8-11 -0.129 0.040 -3.261
12-15 -0.249 0.043 -5.857
16-19 -0.477 0.052 -9.194
20-23 -0.481 0.065 -7.348
24-27 -0.483 0.083 -5.788
28-31 -1.007 0.085 -11.907
32-35 -0.683 0.116 -5.901
36-39 -0.770 0.146 -5.260
40-43 -0.276 0.182 -1.514
44-47 -0.117 0.219 -0.532
48-51 1.215 0.238 5.113
52-55 1.726 0.286 6.037
56-59 0.687 0.296 2.326
60- -0.051 0.073 -0.700
PBD 30-39 and RR Increase (=Eligible for PBD 30-39 and RR * After August 1989)
0-3 -0.039 0.037 -1.055
4-7 0.018 0.065 0.285
8-11 0.051 0.061 0.827
12-15 0.001 0.067 0.016
16-19 0.222 0.073 3.047
20-23 0.118 0.082 1.434
24-27 0.081 0.102 0.798
28-31 0.172 0.102 1.683
32-35 -0.235 0.137 -1.716
36-39 0.188 0.172 1.095
40-43 0.269 0.223 1.209
44-47 -0.071 0.268 -0.265
48-51 -0.408 0.347 -1.177
52-55 0.238 0.355 0.672
56-59 0.101 0.414 0.244
60- -0.215 0.117 -1.831
PBD 30-52 and RR Increase (=Eligible for PBD 30-52 and RR * After August 1989)
0-3 -0.161 0.050 -3.224
4-7 -0.092 0.090 -1.026
8-11 0.056 0.083 0.679
12-15 -0.035 0.089 -0.393
16-19 0.209 0.097 2.150
20-23 0.066 0.107 0.619
24-27 0.298 0.128 2.327
28-31 0.123 0.137 0.893
32-35 -0.325 0.180 -1.801
36-39 -0.018 0.218 -0.083
40-43 0.182 0.259 0.701
44-47 -0.001 0.295 -0.375
48-51 -0.490 0.342 -1.434
52-55 0.387 0.343 1.128
56-59 0.749 0.402 1.863
60- 0.090 0.121 0.750
-log Likelihood 792902.635
Number of Observations 225821
Source: Own calculations, based on Austrian Social Security Data.References
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